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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT-EFFECT ON WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION R.EcovERIES-Decedent, aboard an airliner in his capacity
as flight service supervisor, was killed when the plane crashed into the
Pacific. Respondent airlines, decedent's employer, filed an application with
the California Industrial Accident Commission to determine its liability
under the California Workmen's Compensation Act.1 The commission
awarded decedent's widow a death benefit despite the widow's objection
to the commission's jurisdiction. Prior to the award the widow as administratrix of decedent's estate initiated this action under the Death on the
High Seas Act2 (DHSA) in admiralty. 3 On motion for summary judgment
in respondent's favor, held, motion granted. DHSA is applicable to deaths
arising from crashes of aircraft on the high seas,4 but it was not intended
to supersede state workmen's compensation acts. Since the California compensation statute may be constitutionally applied in the present case,5 and

Cal. Labor Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) §3600.
41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952) §§761-768.
3 This court has previously held that admiralty is the exclusive forum for actions
brought under DHSA. Wilson v. Transocean Airlines, (N.D. Cal. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 85.
This is the majority view, although the courts are not in agreement on the point. See,
generally, comment, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 217 (1954).
4 The fact that DHSA was enacted in 1920 indicates Congress probably did not
consider its application to aircraft. Nevertheless, the courts have been unanimous in
holding the act applicable. But, for an argument that the act should not be so applied,
see comment, 55 CoL. L. REv. 907 (1955). Some cases have regarded DHSA as applicable
by finding as a fact, actually or presumptively, that the impact causing the injury occurred when the aircraft hit the sea, thus meeting the traditional "locality" test of
admiralty tort jurisdiction which DHSA was said to adopt. See, e.g., Wilson v. Transocean
Airlines, note 3 supra; Lacey v. L.W. Wiggins Airways, (D.C. Mass. 1951) 95 F. Supp. 916.
The question whether DHSA also applies where it is shown that the impact occurred
above the high seas has generally •been avoided. See, e.g., Noel v. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, (2d Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 677, cert. den. 355 U.S. 907 (1957). But in a recent
decision the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held it is immaterial whether
the impact was on or above the sea. D'Aleman v. Pan American Vvorld Ainvays, (2d Cir.
1958) 259 F. (2d) 493.
5 It was argued that the application of the compensation act in the present case was
unconstitutional under the doctrine of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 at
216 (1917), where the application of a state compensation act to a maritime worker was
disallowed on the ground that it interfered "with the proper harmony and uniformity
of [the general maritime] law in its international and interstate relations." The court,
however, found that the present case fell within the exception to the general rule, stated
in Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 276 U.S. 467 at 469
(1928), that where the employee is "not engaged in any work so directly connected with
navigation and commerce that to permit the rights of the parties to be controlled by
the local law would interfere with the essential uniformity of the general maritime law"
the compensation act may ·be applied. It was said that decedent, a flight service supervisor,
was "employed in a non-maritime industry and performed no maritime work." While
the decision would undoubtedly stand in light of current judicial hostility to the Jensen
doctrine [e.g., Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942)], the import of the
l
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since its remedy is exclusive,6 it abrogates the DHSA remedy. King v. Pan
American Airways, (N.D. Cal. 1958) 166 F. Supp. 136.
Federal district courts have uniformly held that DHSA supersedes state
wrongful death statutes,7 relying generally on a belief that DHSA was
enacted to provide a uniform rule for recovery of damages for deaths on
non-territorial seas.8 The wrongful death acts, being inconsistent with the
uniformity which Congress sought to create, are therefore superseded.
The question raised by the principal case is whether workmen's compensation acts are likewise inconsistent with the degree of uniformity Congress
intended DHSA to create. Both DHSA and wrongful death acts give relief
only upon a showing of fault, while workmen's compensation requires no
such showing and provides a more certain basis for relief. The court in
the principal case. found that the history of DHSA failed to show an intention to supersede this "unique protection" of the compensation acts,
and was unwilling to assume such a purpose, holding in effect that what
Congress meant to supply was a uniform remedy for liability based on
fault and not a single remedy for all deaths on the high seas. While there
is no direct authority with which the present ruling can be compared,
there is authority which by way of analogy presents an argument for the
principal decision is not clear. It may ,be that the court would hold the same in regard
to any airline employee, on the ground that such employment is never maritime and
that "navigation and commerce" refers only to vessels. Or the court might mean only
that the employment in the present case is not so "directly connected with navigation
and commerce" because the employee in question, unlike a pilot, spent the major part
of his working time on land.
Cal. Labor Code Ann. (Deering, 1953) §3601.
Choy v. Pan-American Airways Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1941) 1941 A.M.C. 483; Echavarria
v. Atlantic & Caribbean Steam Nav. Co., (E.D. N.Y. 1935) 10 F. Supp. 677; comment, 25
J. AIR LAW 102 (1958). But see Higa v. Transocean Airlines, (9th Cir. 1955) 230 F. (2d)
780. This has been the ruling in spite of §7 of DHSA, 41 Stat. 538 (1920), 46 U.S.C. (1952)
§767, which provides: "The provisions of any State statute giving ... remedies for death
shall not be affected .by this chapter." As originally proposed, the provision stated DHSA
should have no effect on state remedies within the territorial limits of the state. This
was changed by a last minute amendment removing the territorial limitation. Some
members of Congress felt the application of state remedies to the .high seas would be
unconstitutional under the Jensen doctrine, note 5 supra. The courts have therefore
reasoned that some voted for the amended version because they felt the territorial limitation superfluous, and not in order to make state remedies applicable. Since Congress'
intent was considered ambiguous, courts have set the provision aside. See Wilson v.
Transocean Airlines, note 3 supra; note, 28 So. CAL. L. REv. 78 (1954). The argument
is equally applicable to workmen's compensation, with which the Jensen doctrine is
directly concerned.
8 This belief is dependent on the history of DHSA. In The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398
(1907), it was held that a state could apply its wrongful death statute to deaths on the
high seas where the vessel involved was owned by a citizen of the state. When it became
apparent that the state remedies were neither uniform nor applicable to all cases, DHSA
was enacted. For a discussion of the history of DHSA, see Magruder and Grout, "Wrongful
Death Within the Admiralty Jurisdiction," 35 YALE L. J. 395 (1926); Hughes, "Death
Actions in Admiralty," 31 YALE L. J. 115 (1921).
6
7
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contrary position. The Supreme Court has held that the Federal Employers
Liability Act, 9 which provides a remedy only where fault is shown, was
intended to supersede state compensation statutes which do not require
such showing. 10 The same view has likewise been recognized in regard to
the Merchant Marine Act of 192011 Gones Act), although the Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on the question. 12 It would seem, however, that
the history of DHSA is sufficiently different from these statutes to justify
the holding in the principal case. With regard to FELA, it is the silence
of Congress on the subject of workmen's compensation in both the FELA
and DHSA which supplies the necessary distinction. FELA was passed
in 1908, two years prior to enactment of the first major state workmen's
compensation law. 13 At that time the intent to have FELA displace state
negligence remedies was in effect the equivalent of an intent to make
FELA the sole basis for relief. Congress spoke in terms of exclusiveness and
complete uniformity without ever considering the effect on workmen's
compensation. The Supreme Court seized on these statements in holding
FELA the only basis for relief, there being nothing to show any intent to
the contrary.14 Workmen's compensation acts were superseded, therefore,
because Congress failed to say they should not be. But by 1920, when
DHSA was passed, workmen's compensation was becoming commonplace.15 Under such circumstances the assumption from Congress' silence
that it intended to displace the fast-growing compensation remedy appears
much more dubious, for it is likely Congress would at ·least have debated
the matter had it intended such an effect.16 The Jones Act decisions may
likewise be distinguished on the basis of legislative history. The Jones

35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. (1952) §§51-60.
York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 147 (1917).
11 38 Stat. 1185 (1915), as amended, 46 U.S.C. (1952) §688.
12 See Gahagan Construction Corp. v. Armao, (1st Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 301, cert.
den. 333 U.S. 876 (1948), note, 29 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 116 (1949); Occidental Indemnity
Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 24 Cal. (2d) 310, 149 P. (2d) 841 (1944). Contra:
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Toups, (5th Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 542, cert. den. 336 U.S. 967
(1949); Beadle v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., (La. App. 1956) 87 S. (2d} 339, note,
31 TULANE L. REv. 655 (1957). See also Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 at 47 (1930),
containing often-cited dicta stating that the Jones Act supersedes all state laws on the
subject.
1a New York passed the first major workmen's compensation statute in 1910. This
was declared unconstitutional in 1911, but was reenacted in 1913 following the amending
of the New York Constitution. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §5.20 (1952).
14 See New York Central R. Co. v. Winfield, note 10 supra, at 150.
15 By 1920 all but eight states had enacted compensation statutes. 1 LARSON, WoRKME.N's COMPENSATION §5.30 (1952).
16 This is particularly true in light of the fact Congress spent considerable time
debating the effect of DHSA on state wrongful death acts with apparently no consideration given to compensation statutes. See 59 CONG. REc. 4482-4486 (1920).
9
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Act was enacted in 1920, the same year in which DHSA was enacted and
three years after FELA had been held to supersede workmen's compensation acts. Congress then incorporated FELA into the Jones Act, in effect
manifesting an intention that the Jones Act should have the same effect.
The courts so holding have therefore a much stronger basis for finding an
intention to supersede than is present in regard to DHSA, and those holdings should not be regarded as applicable to the principal case. In the
absence of more explicit proof that Congress intended DHSA to supersede the dissimilar and more certain workmen's compensation remedy, the
assumption of such a purpose would be but doubtful judicial conjecture.
The court in the principal case refuses justifiably to engage in such activity.
But while the court was justified in its finding, it need not follow.· that
it was correct in holding that such a compensation act, though made exclusive by its language, abrogates DHSA. Congress might have meant
DHSA and workmen's compensation to be concurrent remedies. The present
decision leaves the applicability of DHSA, in areas where compensation
acts are constitutionally applicable, to the discretion of the states. The
court reaches this result by relying on Supreme Court decisions holding
that state compensation acts abrogate general admiralty jurisdiction where
the injury involved is a matter of local concem.17 Yet these decisions in
regard to the abrogation of general maritime law remedies came after
DHSA was enacted in 1920. To assume from its silence that Congress
intended to have DHSA displaced by state compensation statutes because
the general maritime law was later held to be displaced by such statutes
is unwarranted, 18 particularly where the practical effect is the suspension
of a federal statute. There is, however, analogical authority in support of
the court's holding to which it made no reference. Decisions holding that
the Jones Act does not supersede state workmen's compensation acts have
generally held that the compensation acts, if exclusive, do abrogate the
Jones remedy.19 While this may not be the better rule, the analogy would
at ·least support the principal case, for on this question the histories of
the Jones Act and DHSA are indistinguishable.

Thomas E. Kauper, S. Ed.

17 Millers' Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926); Grant Smith-Porter
Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922).
18 Prior to 1920 at least one federal court had ruled that an "exclusive" state workmen's compensation act did not abrogate a seaman's remedy under the general maritime
law. Riegel v. Higgins, (N.D. Cal. 1917) 241 F. 718.
19 Woods v. Merrill-Stevens Dry Dock & Repair Co., (S.D. Fla. 1936) 14 F. Supp.
208; Fuentes v. Gulf Coast Dredging Co., (5th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 69. The court deciding
the principal case has so held. Surgeon v. Alaska Packers Assn., (N.D. Cal. 1939) 26 F.
Supp. 241.

